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NOTES AND COMMENTS
RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT PRISON DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS

I am society's collector of debts, and
my purse is the bottomless maw of time
insatiably storing the payments of days
implacably totaling the months and the years . ..
Come-come and look upon the faces of these I hold
and see thereon the reflection of my image,
engraven as a deep and final proof
of society's inadequacy, of man's inhumanity . ..
I am gut-searching anguish destroying the man
who is with desperate hope,
waiting
for the letters, the visitors, that never come . ..
Yes, I AM THE PRISON
Wherein the smothering confines of a steel-barred cage
crush with the weight of inhuman reality;
wherein the' endless emptiness of the days
and the shattering loneliness of the eternal nights,
repeat and repeat and repeat my message . .. endlessly. I
The developing judicial attitude toward prisoners' rights is that" [a]
prisoner retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen except those
expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from him by law.,,2 The
older retributive view of penology, that the inmate was a "slave of the
state" with minimal legal rights,3 has been discarded, not only because
of humanitarian influences, but also by way of necessity in the wake of
inmate rebellion. This note will explore and analyze the effects of a
budding trend to require legal counsel at prison disciplinary hearings
based substantially on fourteenth amendment due process requirements.
1. CURRENT STATE OF PRISONERS' RIGHTS
Traditionally, prisoner complaints alleging unconstitutional treatment have been ignored by the courts, and judicial review has been
avoided under the "hands-off" doctrine on the grounds that the
1. Hunt, R. L., I Am The Prison, 1 PRISON L. REP. 1 (Oct. 1971) (Poem by Inmate, Ariz.
State Prison).
2. Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 225 U.S. 887 (1945).
3. "He [the convicted felon] has, as a consequence of his crime, not only forfeited his liberty,
but all his personal rights except those which the law in its humanity accords to him. He is
for the time being the slave of the State." Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. (21 Gratt.)
1024, 1026 (1871).
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handling of prisoners was a complicated task which required expertise
that the courts admittedly did not possess. 4 This doctrine was applied
so mechanically that a claim which alleged that a prisoner had been
beaten to death would go unreviewed. s
-- As a result, this immunity from judicial scrutiny prevented the public
from acquiring knowledge of prison conditions and led to a breakdown
in the corrections phase of the criminal process. The central problem
was that, more often than not, prison administrators and staff also
lacked the requisite expertise to deal with prison conditions. 6
The Supreme Court recognized this problem by abolishing the
"hands-off" doctrine 7 in the landmark case of Johnson v. Avery, 8
stating that "where state regulations applicable to inmates of prison
facilities conflict with [federal constitutional] rights, the regulations
may be invalidated.,,9 Therefore, it appears that the "courts
[are] ... replacing the 'hands-off' approach with a determination of
the reasonableness of the regulation.,,1 0
The primary vehicles eroding the "hands-off" doctrine have come in
the areas of religion, I I censorship, I 2 and access to the courts I 3 and to
4. The "hands-off" doctrine has been justified in the following manner: inasmuch as Congress has placed control of the federal prison system under the Attorney General, and
inasmuch as the control of a state prison system is vested in the Governor or his delegated
representatives, a federal court is powerless to intervene in the internal administration of
this executive function even to protect prisoners from the deprivation of their constitutional rights. See, e.g., United States ex rei. Morris v. Radio Station WENR, 209 F.2d
105 (7th Cir. 1953), Williams v. Steele, 194 F.2d 32 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
822 (1952); Platek v. Aderhold, 73 F.2d 173 (5th Cir . .1934).
For another interpretation of the "hands-off' doctrine see Millemann, Prison Disciplinary Hearings and Procedural Due Process-The Requirement of a Full Administrative
Hearing, 31 MD. L. REV. 27, 36 n.44 (1971): "The doctrine is best described as a selfimposed limit on jurisdiction based upon respect for federal-state comity and a deference to the expertise of prison administrators."
5. State, ex reI. Clark v. Feriing, 220 Md. 109, 151 A.2d 137 (1959).
6. Ashman, Rhetoric and Reality of Prison Reform, The Daily Record (Baltimore) Aug. 29,
1972, at 1, col. 5.
7. See Note, The Inadequacy of Prisoners' Rights to Provide Sufficient Protection for Those
Confined in Penal Institutions, 48~N.C.L. REV. 847, 849 n.8 (1970).
8. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
9. Id. at 486.
10. See Note, The Problems of Modern Penology: Prison Life and Prisoners' Rights, 53
IOWA L. REV. 671, 671-72 (1967); cf. Haines v. Keiner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
The cases now establish that prisoners have rights to gather for corporate religious
11.
services, to consult a minister of their faith, to possess religious books like the
Koran and Message To The Blackman in America, to subscribe to religious literature, including Muhammad Speaks, to wear unobtrusive religious medals and
other symbols, to have prepared a special diet required by their religion, and to
correspond with their spiritual leader .... [Hlowever, ... where prison officials
can make an affirmative showing that the religious sect in question abuses ...
[these various rights,l ... reasonable limitations may be imposed.
Turner, Establishing the Rule of Law in Prisons: A Manual for Prisoners' Rights Litigation, 23 STAN. L. REV. 473, 484 (1971).
12. See generally Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d 545 (1st Cir. 1971), in which inmates were
given the right to send letters concerning prison management to the news media, as long
as those letters did not contain or concern control and plan of escape, or device for evading prison regulation; in Van Ermen v. Schmidt, 343 F. Supp. 377 (W.D. Wisc. 1972), the
court stated that Wisconsin officials must show "compelling interest" to justify rule pro-
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counsel. 1 4 "By recognizing that the Constitution's protections extend
through prison walls, [the recent trend has] set the stage for the
application of due process principles to prison [disciplinary hearings] .,,15

II. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AT PRISON
DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS
The courts in recent years have been more willing, as in other areas
of prisoners' rights, to examine inmates' alleged denials of procedural
due process at prison disciplinary hearings. Since "[i] t is now well
established that incarceration does not mean that prisoners have no
constitutional rights,"! 6 the forums in which these rights have been
challenged must now, in order to prevent arbitrary treatment, adhere to
judicially established safeguards. 1 7 The Federal District Court for
Maryland, in Bundy u. Cannon, 1 8 discussed the nature of procedural
due process in the prison setting in stating that the type of proceeding
necessary to guarantee a particular right depends upon "[t]he nature of

13.

14.

15.

16.
17.
18.

hibiting receipt of law books other than from publisher; Sostre v. Otis, 330 F. Supp. 941
(S.D.N.Y. 1971), held that incoming books and periodicals may not be censored unless
the inmate is given notice that the literature was being censored and unless the censorship was rendered by a body that would be expected to act fairly; the court in Fortune
Society v. McGinnis, 319 F. Supp. 901 (S.D. N.Y. 1970), stated that prisoners have a right
to receive any publications except those that the prison can show a clear and present
danger to security or involve some other compelling interest; and in Palmigiano v. Tcavisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.!. 1970), the court entered a temporary restraining order
ending the reading and censorship of all incoming and outgoing mail, including that of
courts, government officials and attorneys.
See generally Ex Parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941) (state prisons may not abridge or impair
an inmate's right to apply to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972) (prison officials
may not punish inmates for bringing suit against the prison administration); Meola v.
Fitzpatrick, 322 F. Supp. 878 (D. Mass.1971) (prison officials may not confiscate or delay
legal pleadings or correspondence addressed to the courts); Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F.
Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal. 1970), afrd sub nom. Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971) (prison
officials must establish a library which insures that indigent prisoners can obtain a fair
hearing by the judiciary).
Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (legitimized the "jailhouse lawyer"); Goodwin v.
Oswald, 462 F.2d 1237 (2d Cir. 1972) (prison official required to deliver letters from the
Legal Aid Society to inmate-clients advising them on legal status of a prisoner's union);
Smith v. Robbins, 454 F.2d 696 (1st Cir. 1972) (court enjoined inspection of incoming mail
from attorneys for contraband unless done in the inmate's presence); Jansson v. Grysen,
Civil No. 6-130-71 C.A. (N.D. Mich. June 5, 1972) (jail authorities may not open or restrict
length of inmate's mail to or from official or attorneys).
Millemann, supra note 4, at 37. For an extensive discussion of prisoner's rights. see Rent!ral/y Hollen, Emerging Prisoners' Rights. 33 OHIO ST. L.J. (1972); .symposium: PrISoner's Rights, 63 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 154 (1972); Tibbles, Ombudsmen for American
Prisons, 48 N. OAK. L. REV. 383 (1972).
Bundy v. Cannon, 328 F. Supp. 165, 172 (D. Md. 1971), citing Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S.
333 (1968); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d
Cir. 1971); Edwards v. Duncan, 355 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1966).
Comment, Intra-Penal Disciplinary Proceedings, 1971 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 618, 627.
328 F. Supp. 165 (D. Md. 1971).
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the alleged right involved, 'the nature of the proceeding, and the
possible burden on that proceeding .... ,,1 9
To determine whether the requirements of due process apply to
prison disciplinary hearings a "balancing test" has been suggested,2 0
whereby the courts, in examining the rights of the prisoners, must
balance the necessities of managing and administrating a prison against
the inmate's interest in the right in question. 2 1 The Supreme Court, in
Goldberg v. Kelly/2 stated that the affording of procedural due
process is "influenced by the extent to which [one] may be
'condemned to suffer grievous loss,' ... and depends upon whether
the ... interest in avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental
interest in summary adjudication.,,2 3
It must then be decided when to invoke the "balancing test," i.e.
what is the nature of the inmates' liberty, and when must it be
protected by pro,cedural due process? The federal courts 24 are in
agreement that the loss of "good conduct time,,,2 5 which has the effect
of extending the inmate's stay in prison, and the imposition of
segregation or solitary confinement, which may affect the inmate's
sanity,26 both involve a sufficiently grevious loss of liberty to require
due process hearings. Furthermore, an adverse disciplinary record may
affect the inmate's eligibility for parole. 2 7
The traditional rebuttal by the state to prison disciplinary due
process hearings is that there is no right to good time and maximum
institutional freedom; instead, they represent good time as a privilege
granted by the state to the prisoner. However, the Supreme Court has
refuted this argument in the landmark case of Morrissey v. Brewer, 2 8 in
19. [d. at 172, citing Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).

20. See Millemann, supra note 4, at 34.
21. Hermann, Schwartz, Kolleeny, Campana & Harvey, Due Process in Prison Disciplinary
Proceedings, 29 GUILD PRAC. 79, 80 (1972).
22. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
23. [d. at 263, citing Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951)
(Frankfurter J., concurring). See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (citing favorably the Goldberg standard); Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886
(1961).
'
24. See cases cited note 36 infra.
25. Millemann, supra note 4, at 40 n.63 states:
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 700 (b}-(d) (1971) authorize five days a month diminution of sentence for inmates "not guilty of a violation of the discipline or ... rules"
,of the institution and an additional five days monthly for inmates who excel in their
employment or maintain satisfactory progress in educational and training courses.
Section 700 (e) requires the forfeiture of that "good time" which is earned in the
month in which an inmate violates prison rules or exercises a lack of fidelity or care
in the performance of his work or in his educational and vocational training.
Section 700 (e) also empowers the Department of Corrections to deduct "a portion or all" of an inmate's "good time" as punishment for any of the above-mentioned delinquencies.
26. See Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N. Y. 1970), affd in part, rev'd in part,
modified in part sub nom. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971).
27. Hermann, supra note 21, at 84.
28. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
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stating that: "It is hardly useful any longer to try to deal with this
problem [parole revocation] in terms of whether the liberty is a 'right'
or a 'privilege.' By whatever name the liberty is valuable and must be
seen as within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment."29 The
Sands v. Wainwright 30 court recently stated that the "rights-privileges"
distinction is nonexistent, i.e. once a privilege is granted, the inmate is
entitled to it. Therefore, procedural due process comes into play when
the entitlement is taken away.
Once it has been established in a particular case that the inmate may
suffer grievous loss or that the inmate's right outweighs the prison's
interest in impairing that right, it is necessary to determine the specific
protections the courts are employing to effect that inmate's right of
procedural due process. Initially, some courts have indicated that due
process standards were not met in the particular disciplinary hearings
without going so far as to state what constituted adequate standards.
For example, in Talley v. Stephens, 3 I a prisoner had been summarily
whipped for alleged violations. The court enjoined use of the strap until
its use was surrounded by appropriate due process safeguards, but the
court did not discuss what would constitute appropriate safeguards.
More recently, a similar position was taken in Sostre v. McGinnis, 3 2
where the Second Circuit Court of Appeals overruled an order that the
inmate petitioner may not forfeit earned good time credit unless
specific procedural protections were implemented. 33 However, in
overruling the District Court, the Court of Appeals stated: "[W] e are
not to be understood as disapproving the judgment of many courts that
our constitutional scheme does not contemplate that society may
commit lawbreakers to the capricious and arbitrary actions of prison
officials."34 In other words, while recognizing the inmate's right to due
process, the court did not indicate its approval of specific delineated
procedural protections. 3 5
Other courts have been more precise in their approach to the
29. [d. at 482.
30. Civil No. 71-339-Civ-J-S (M.D. Fla., Jan. 5, 1973).
31. 247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965). See also United States ex rei. Campbell v. Pate, 401
F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1968).
32. 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971).
33. The specific procedural protections included: "(a) written notice of the charges against
him; (b) a recorded hearing before a disinterested official with a chance to cross-examine
adverse witnesses and call witnesses in his own behalf; (c) the right to retain counsel substitute; and _.. (d) a written decision ... ," [d. at 195.
34. [d. at 198.
35. However, the court did relent and to some extent indicated what process was "due":
If substantial deprivations are to be visited upon a prisoner, it is wise that such action should at least be premised on facts rationally determined. This is not a concept without meaning. In most cases it would probably be difficult to find an inquiry minimally fair and rational unless the prisoner were confronted with the
accusation, informed of the evidence against him, and afforded a reasonable opportunity to explain his actions.
[d. (citations omitted).
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question of what constitutes due process. In Bundy v. Cannon, 3 6
seventy-two inmates involved in a work stoppage were transferred from
a medium security institution (Maryland House of Correction), to the
punitive segregation quarters of a maximum security institution
(Maryland Penitentiary). Seventeen of the seventy-two inmates accused
of specific acts of misconduct were to be indefinitely confined in
segregation at Maryland Penitentiary, forfeit five days of good conduct
time, and lose another hundred days upon approval of the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections. The other fifty-five were
to be confined in segregation at the penitentiary for at least thirty days.
In none of the cases did the inmate receive, prior to his hearings,
written notice of any charges or allegations of misconduct, nor was he
provided with representation at the hearing or allowed to present
witnesses of his own or to cross-examine his accusers. The. Federal
District Court for Maryland held that punishment imposed in this
manner violated the requirements of procedural due process.
While the Bundy decision was still pending, the Department of
Corrections promulgated the following rules: 3 7
1) The inmate shall be furnished a written statement of the charges
not later than forty-eight hours after the ~leged violation, and the
inmate will appear before the disciplinary adjustment team within
seventy-two hours of the alleged infraction;
2) A hearing shall be held before an impartial tribunal in all cases
which could result in the imposition of serious punishment;3 8
3) The inmate shall appear before the adjustment team to discuss his
case and he shall be represented by another inmate or a staff member
(if the accused or representative desires);
4) The inmate may call witnesses (including his accusers) and may
question such witnesses;
5) The adjustment team shall make a written report of the
proceedings to include a summary of the evidence, the team's
36. 328 F. Supp. 165 (D. Md. 1971). See cases cited note 16 liupra. See also Krause v.
Schmidt, 341 F. Supp. 1001 (W.D. Wis. 1972), in which inmates won a preliminary injunction against disciplinary sanctions imposed without procedural due process. The
court imposed Bundy procedural protections; Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621
(E.D. Va. 1971), applied Bundy due process requirements to disciplinary hearings in a
Virginia state prison whenever there was an imposition of solitary confinement, transfer
to maximum security, loss of good-time, or 10 day padlock confinement; Clutchette v.
Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971), appeal docketed, No. 71-2357, 9th Cir.,
Aug. 30, 1971, held that state-instituted disciplinary proceedings at San Quentin had to
be· halted until some due process, equivalent to that in Bundy, was instituted; Morris v.
Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.I. 1970), outlined detailed procedural due process
guidelines; cf. Kritsky v. McGinnis, 313 F. Supp. 1247 (N.D. N.Y. 1970), affd 456 F.2d 79
(2d Cir. 1971) (en bane), cert. granted sub nom. Oswald v. Rodriguez, 407 U.S. 919 (1972).
37. 328 F. Supp. at 175. The cited rules apply only to major infractions (possible confinement
for more than fifteen days in segregation and/or the loss of good time of more than five
days).
38. The Maryland Department of Corrections employs hearing officers to satisfy this requirement.
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evaluation and decision, and the reason for such decision. The decision
of the team must be based on substantial evidence;
6) The inmate shall be informed of the decision and may appeal if he
objects to the decision. 3 9 Judge Thomsen indicated his approval of
these standards in his opinion. 4 0
The trend toward recognizing the inmate's constitutional right to
procedural due process has expanded since the Bundy decision. In
Collins v. Schoonfield,4 I the court granted specific due process rights
to pre-trial detainees in Baltimore City Jail who were threatened with
confinement in isolation or solitary confinement;42 and in United
States ex rei. Neal v. Wolfe,43 a Pennsylvania inmate won a $514.60
damage judgment against the state prison officials for sixteen days of
solitary confinement, and loss of job status imposed without due
process of law. The court recognized that due process demanded the
imposition of standards similar to those recognized in Bundy, i.e.
advance notice of charges, a hearing before an impartial tribunal, and
the opportunity to call defense witnesses and cross-examine adverse
witnesses. In Brown v. Schubert,4 4 when the superintendent of a state
hospital ordered the confined plaintiffs to be transferred to maximum
security facilities after learning that the patients had mailed letters to
the press, the district court granted the plaintiffs a preliminary
injunction because the transfers were made without due process of law;
reference was made to Bundy-type procedural protections. In Lathrop
v. Brewer,45 the court ruled that the prison officials' failure to contact
inmates' witnesses in disciplinary proceedings resulted in a denial of
confrontation and cross-examination which constituted a violation of
due process and therefore rendered the proceedings null and void.
Prisoners' procedural due process rights were further recognized in
Sands v. Wainwright,46 which not only granted Bundy procedural
protections to Florida prison inmates, but also allowed inmates to
retain counsel at disciplinary hearings. 4 7
39. The rules provide that the warden shall review all cases involving major violations. The
author of this note, a former employee of Maryland Diagnostic·Reception Center, wit·
nessed several disciplinary proceedings in which the hearing officer always informed
the inmate that his decision was appealable.
40. 328 F. Supp. at 174. Accord, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
41. 344 F. Supp. 257 (D. Md. 1972). Although Collins was a case involving constitutional
rights of pre· trial detainees (persons who have forfeited no rights due to conviction), this
circumstance alone does not distinguish the Collins rule from other decisions involving
prisoners. The state has the same interest in the speedy disposition of a disciplinary case
in both jail and prison situations; the pre-trial detainee and prison inmate have the same
interest in avoiding segregated confinement.
42. Id. at 273-74. See also Taylor v. Sterrett, 344 F. Supp. 411 (N.D. Tex. 1972). Contra,
Clements v. Hamilton, Civil No. 7001 (W.O. Ky., May 3, 1972).
43. 346 F. Supp. 569 (B.D. Pa. 1972).
44. 347 F. Supp. 1232 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
45. 340 F. Supp. 873 (S.D. Iowa 1972).
46. Civil No. 71-339-Civ-J-S (M.D. Fla., Jan. 5, 1973).
47. Id.
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III. RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT PRISON DISCIPLINARY
HEARINGS
A. DUE PROCESS
Against this background of emerging prisoners' rights in such areas as
first amendment freedoms, right to access to the courts, and the right to
procedural due process, there is an emerging attitude that prisoners are
entitled to assistance by counsel at disciplinary hearings. 48 The
underlying premise is that the right to counsel in all criminal
prosecutions, as a necessary ingredient of due process, is a fundamental
right, and that the state is precluded from abridging that right unless
there is a "compelling state interest" to be safeguarded. 49 The
historical basis for this concept is found in Powell v. Alabama,s 0 in
which the Supreme Court held that a failure of the state court to
appoint counsel in a capital case violated "fundamental fairness,"
thereby denying fourteenth amendment due process protection. The
Court reasoned that a valid hearing has always included the right to the
aid of counsel and that "[ t] he right to be heard would be, in many
cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by
counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and
sometimes no skill in the science of law."s 1
48. Brief for Appellant at 21, Nieves v. Oswald, Dkt. No. 72-1974 (2d Cir. 1972), setting forth
the following commentators who urge the presence of counsel at prison disciplinary hearings:
Hollen, Emerging Prisoners Rights, 33 Ohio St. L. J. 1,60 (1972); Turner & Daniel,
Miranda in Prison: The Dilemma of Prison Discipline and Intramural Crime, 21
Buff. L. Rev. 759 (1972); Forys, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners, 55 Mili. L. Rev.
1,39 (1972); Brant, Prison Disciplinery [SIC 1Proceedmgs; Creating Rights, 21 Clev.
St. L. Rev. 83 (1972); Singer, Confining Solitary Confinement: Constitutional Arguments for a "New Penology," 56 Iowa L. Rev. 1251, 1292 n.188 (1971); Millemann,
Prison DiSCiplinary Proceedings and Procedural Due Process, 31 Md. L. Rev. 27
(1971); 1 Kraft, Prison Disciplinary Practices and Procedures, 47 N. D. L. Rev.
9, 71 (1970); Jacob, Prison Discipline and InmatelRights, 5 Harv. Civ. Libs.- Civ.
Rts. L. Rev. 227, 247 (1970). Note, Scope of 14th Amendment Due Process: Right
to Counsel in Disciplinary Proceedings, 1971 Utah L. Rev. 275. Note, Decency and
Fairness: An Emerging Judicial Role for Prison Reform, 57 Va. L. Rev. 841, 874-75
(1971); Note, Procedural Due Process in Prison Disciplinary Proceedings, 2 Loy.
L. J. 110 (1971); Note, Procedural Due Process for Peno-Correctional Administration: Progressive and Regressive, 45 St. Johns 468, 483 (1971); Note, Federal Court
1lltervention in State Prison Disciplinary Hearings to Guarantee 14th Amendment
Due Process, 17 Wayne L. Rev. 931,949 (1971). See also NSCD, A Model Act for
the Protection of Rights of Prisoners § 4 (1972); President's Commission on Criminial Justice and Administration, Task Force: Corrections 86 (1967).
49. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 70 (1932).
50. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
51. [d. at 68-69. Contra, Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 1028 (1968) (no right to counsel at disciplinary proceeding against high school
student); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967) (no right to counsel at disciplinary proceeding against cadet attending Merchant Marine Academy). These cases
are distinguishable from prison disciplinary hearings because the amount of personal
liberty at stake in prison hearings entitles a prisoner to greater protection than the possible suspension or expulsion from a school or college. Furthermore, most students are better able to protect their rights than presumably less-educated prison inmates. Millemann,
supra note 4, at 56 n.60.
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More recently, the Supreme CourtS 2 has interpreted the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment as incorporating the protections of
the sixth amendment, thus making them applicable to the states.
Although the accused now has a right to counsel in all cases involving
the imposition of one or more days of incarceration,s 3 along with the
recognized pre-trial protections,s 4 the courts until recently have been
reluctant to afford right to counsel protections after sentencing. S S
However, in Mempa v. Rhay, S 6 the Supreme- Court held that as a
result of due process requirements, a defendant had a right to counsel
at a post-trial proceeding for revocation of his probation since
imposition of deferred sentencing is a critical stage of a criminal
proceeding materially affecting the substantial rights of the accused.
Mempa arose under a Washington State laws 7 which requires the
sentencing judge to impose the statutory maximum, but also requires
that he submit his recommendation to the parole board regarding the
length of time the prisoner should serve. s 8 Though the final
determination of the sentence is the responsibility of the parole board,
the judge's recommendation is usually given considerable weight. The
Supreme Court held that the right to counsel attaches at the hearing to
determine the judge's recommendation; counsel is deemed necessary for
marshalling the facts, introducing evidence of mitigating circumstances,
and giving general aid and assistance to the defendant in presenting his
case as to the length of sentence to be served. Although many courts
have interpreted Mempa as restricting the right to counsel to sentencing
proceedings and denying the assistance of counsel where the defendant
has been sentenced but has not yet been placed on probation,S 9
Mempa is more accurately "an important incursion by the federal
judiciary into the state peno-correctional area.,,6 0 The distinction lies
52. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
53. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
54. See generally Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (appointed counsel required at preliminary hearing); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (appointed counsel required
when suspect taken custody); Escobedo v. lllinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (appointed counsel required when the investigation focuses on the individual suspect); Hamilton v.
Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) (appointed counsel required at arraignment).
55. See Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971).
56. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
57. See REV. CODE WASH. ANN. §§ 9.95.010, 9.95.030 (1961).
58. 389 U.S. at 135.
59. See, e.g., Shaw v. Henderson, 430 F.2d 1116 (5th Cir. 1970); Brown v. Warden, 351 F.2d
564 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1028 (1966); United States v. Hartsell, 277 F.
Supp. 993 (E.D. Tenn. 1967). See also Knight v. State, 7 Md. App. 313, 255 A.2d 441
(1969) {probationer may be represented at hearing by counsel but an indigent has no right
to have counsel appointed unless due process would be affronted. But see Laquay
State, _ Md. ~ 299 A.2d 527 (1973) (although sentence had already been imposed, an
indigent probationer was denied due process, under the circumstances, by lack of appointed counsel at the revocation hearing).
60. Note, Federal Court Intervention in State Prison Internal Di.~ciplinary Hearings to Guarantee Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process, 17 WAYNE L. REV. 931, 949
(1971). For decisions requiring the presence of counsel at parole revocation hearings see
Mozingo v. Craven, 341 F. Supp. 296 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Goolsby v. Gagnon, 322 F. Supp.
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in the fact that in Washington the judge has no choice in determining
the length of the sentence; it is set by statute and ultimately
determined by the parole board. In other states, the judge has full
responsibility for setting sentence. The role of counsel in Mempa is to
produce facts for indirect use by the parole board in determining
whether the probationer's conditional liberty will be revoked. The
Court's reasoning, that counsel is required at every stage of a criminal
proceeding where the substantial rights of the accused may be affected,
implicitly recognized that penal proceedings affecting the freedom of
the individual and the form of his incarceration require counsel to
protect his personal liberty, i.e. his substantial rights.6 I By analogy,
since prison disciplinary decisions affect the freedom of the accused
inmate (revocation of good time extends his sentence) as well as the
form of his incarceration (institutional confinement versus solitary
confinement), Mempa arguably requires counsel at disciplinary hearings
to protect the substantial rights of the accused inmate. 6 2
The Supreme Court recently had the opportunity to rule on the issue
of the right to counsel at post-trial proceedings in Morrissey v.
Brewer.63 Although the Court applied Bundy due process protections
to parole revocation hearings, the majority refused to rule on whether a
parolee is entitled to the assistance of retained counsel, or to appointed
counsel if he is indigent. 64 Three justices felt that the Court should

61.

62.

63.
64.

460 (E.D. Wis. 1971); People ex rei. Combs v. LaVallee, 29 App. Div. 2d 128,286 N.Y.S.
2d 600 (1968); Commonwealth v. Tinson, 433 Pa. 328, 249 A.2d 549 (1969); and for decisions requiring the presence of counsel at probation revocation hearings see Mempa v.
Rhay, 389 U.S. i28 (1967); Hewett v. North Carolina, 415 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 19(9);
Gunsolus v. Gagnon, 454 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 40. U.S.L.W. 3617 (U.S.
June 26, 1972) (No. 71-1225); Perry v. Williard, 247 Ore. 145, 427 P.2d 1020 (1967);
Oestrich v. State, 55 Wis. 222, 198 N.W.2d 664(1972) (requires counsel at probation and
parole TPvocation hearings).
See Comment, Due Process: The Right to Counsel in Parole Release Hearings, 54 IOWA L.
REV. 497, 503 (1968). In administrative hearings where the personal liberty of a party is at
stake, the proceedings closely approximate criminal proceedings and therefore require
the presence of counsel. Examples of such hearings requiring the presence of counsel in
most jurisdictions include commitments for insanity or communicable disease and commitments under several psychopathy laws.
See also MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 A, § 4(b)(5) (1971), which provides that legal representation shall be provided to indigents III ·any ... proceeding where possible incarceration
pursuant to a judicial commitment of individuals in institutions of a public or private nature may result."
See Note, supra note 60, at 949. which states: "The liberal reading of Mempa therefore
calls for the right to counsel in prison disciplinary hearings because determination of
length of incarceration is an obviously 'critical stage' where rights of the prisoner are affected; and parole decisions are based on inmate conduct as determined by the prison
disciplinary board."
See also Smith & Pollack, After Conviction: Therapy or Punishment, 1 STUDENT LAW.
7, at 51 (1973), which states: "The [Mempa] decision ... may be ... an important first
step in broadening the post-adjudicatory rights of probationers, prisoners and parolees."
(emphasis added).
408 U.S. 471 (1972).
See Singer, Morrissey u. Brewer: Implications for the Future of Correctional Law,
PRISON L. REP. 287 , 289 (1972), which states:
[T]he Court's reluctance to hold that there was a right to counsel may stem from
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have ruled on the right to counsel question: Justices Brennan and
Marshall stated that the parolee must at least be allowed to retain
counsel,6s while Justice Douglas expressed the view that the parolee
should be entitled to counsel. 66 This dilemma was discussed in
Sands,67 where the court denied inmates the right to appointed
counsel. The Court recognized, however, that although there is no duty
upon the state to furnish counsel in prison disciplinary proceedings, an
inmate must be allowed to retain an attorney if he so desires. 6 8
While it has not been conclusively stated by the courts that inmates
have the right, or must be allowed, to retain counsel at disciplinary
proceedings, this procedural safeguard has been applied in differing
areas of civil administrative proceedings. Using the previously discussed
"balancing test" where private interests are at stake, counsel is allowed
when a welfare recipient may be denied benefits,69 or where a public
housing tenant may be evicted. 7 0 Prisoners who arguably have a
potentially greater interest at stake than welfare recipients and public
housing tenants, still are not allowed or have the right to legal counsel
in most jurisdictions. 7 I The court in Landman v. Royster 72
recognized the potential severity of prison discipline 73 and concluded
that inmates should be entitled to representation by retained counsel at
proceedings which threaten these interests since these "deprivation [s]
may be momentarily as telling as the loss of financial support or
housing .... "7 4
Furthermore, while there is no significant disparity between the
conditional liberty 7 5 at stake in prison disciplinary hearings and the

65.
66.

67.
68.

69.
70.
71.

72.
73.

74.
75.

two other considerations: (a) the issue was not directly before the Court; (b) this
opinion was written by Chief Justice Burger who would have had to repudiate in
toto his opinion in Hyser v. Reed, were he to find that there was a right to counsel
at the parole revocation hearings.
See also Gunsolus v. Gagnon, 454 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W.
3617 (U.S. June 26, 1972) (No. 71-1225), which presents before the Supreme Court the
question of the right to counsel at probation proceedings.
408 U.S. at 491.
[d. at 498.
Civil No. 71-339-Civ-J-S (M.D. Fla., Jan. 5, 1973).
[d. at 28.
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
Caulder v. Durham Housing Authority, 433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 1003 (1971).
While staff or inmate substitute counsel are required· in many jurisdictions. legal counsel
is not even allowea upon request. See, e.g., Bunay v. Cannon, 328 F. Supp. 165 (D. Md.
1971); Morris v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.1. 1970). Contra, Sands v. Wainwright,
Civil No. 71-339-Civ-J-S (M.D. Fla., Jan. 5, 1973).
333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971).
ld. at 652, stating:
A man in solitary confinement is denied all human intercourse and any means of diversion. Padlock confinement isolates the individual as well from his fellows. Maximum security confinement is a lesser penalty, but like the others it interrupts a
prisoner's efforts at rehabilitation and curtails many recreational activities. Loss of
good time credit may in effect amount to an additional prison sentence.
[d.
Inmate conditional liberty encompasses institutional freedom from solitary confinement
and traditional freedom which is denied by the inability to earn good time.
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conditional liberty at stake in probation or parole revocation hearings,
probationers and parolees, in a growing number of cases, are entitlec;l to
legal assistance. 7 6 Other situations which require presence of counsel
include: the possibility that the defendant may be imprisoned for one
day,77 the possibility of commitment to a mental institution,7 S and
possible confinement in a juvenile institution. 7 9 Certainly "the interest
which [prisoners] have at stake in these disciplinary hearings is
substantial enough, and indistinguishable enough, from the above-cited
interests to require representation by retained counsel when that
interest is to be revoked."s 0
As previously discussed, where prisoners show a grevious loss of
liberty, the right to counsel should attach at disciplinary hearings' unless
the state will be unduly burdened. Such state interests will certainly
encompass the argument that the presence of counsel will delay
disciplinary hearings and will constitute an undue administrative burden
upon prison officials and the conduct of disciplinary hearings. s I
Although the delay is possibly significant since it seemingly erodes the
principles that punishment should be speedy and that pre-hearing
detention should be short, "[ t] he question is not whether, because of
delay, counsel should be excluded but rather, what reasonable rules and
regulations would allow the presence of counsel without exacerbating
the delay problem."s 2 One court solved this problem by stating that "a
prisoner who desires to secure counsel ... may reasonably be limited to
four days."s 3 This state interest in summary adjudication, however,
ignores the other goal of the disciplinary process, i. e. accuracy in
finding facts and the fairness of the result. 8 4 One reason for the
Supreme Court's requirement, in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 8 5 of counsel in
any criminal case carrying a potential prison sentence is that the
preserrce of counsel can play some role in slowing down "assembly-line
justice.,,86
Other state interests include the burden which would be placed upon
prison officials if prisoners were allowed legal counsel. The prison staff
76. See cases cited note 60 supra.
77. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
78. Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968).
79. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See also State ex rei. Bernal v. Hershman, 54 Wis. 2d 626,
196 N. W.2d 721 (1972) (requires counsel at proceedings to revoke juvenile's "liberty under
supervision").
80. Brief for Plaintiff at 34, Inmates v. McColley, Civil No. 72·764-M (D. Md. 1973) [herein.,
after cited as Brief for Plaintiff), citing Collins v. Schoon field, 344 F. Supp. 257 (D. Md.
1972); Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971); Krause v. Schmidt, 341
F. Supp. 1001 (W.D. Wis. 1972). See also Campbell v. Rodgers, Civil No. 1462·71
(D.D.C., Jan. 11, 1972), where an amended consent order provided for representation by
counselor law students at disciplinary hearings in the District of Columbia jail.
81. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 80, at 38.
82. Id. at 39. See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
83. Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 654 (E.D. Va. 1971).
84. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 80, at 39.
85. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
86. Id. at 36.
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would have to contact the inmate's attorney; indigent inmates would
conceivably claim they are entitled to appointed counsel if such
representation may be retained by financially able inmates;8 7 and the
disciplinary hearings may be disrupted by the presence of counsel
intimidating legally untrained hearing officers.
While these contentions may justify limiting the role of counsel, they
do not constitute such a "compelling state interest" as to weight the
"balancing test" in favor of the state: 1) requiring prison employees to
make telephone calls is certainly not a substantial burden on the state
justifying the total exclusion of legal counsel from disciplinary
hearings;88 2) the presence of counsel will not subvert the authority of
the hearing officers since the rules of evidence do not apply to these
proceedings;89 3) the hearing officer is fully empowered to order the
attorney to leave if he causes. any problems;90 and 4) there are
administrative settings which allow the presence of counsel though the
hearing officer is without legal training. 9 I Regarding an indigent
inmate's claim to appointed counsel, it is well accepted that "the state
may choose to solve part of a problem without dedicating itself to a
complete solution.,,9 2 Even if there were some requirement for
appointing counsel to represent indigent inmates, there are adequate
legal sources available without placing the expense of providing counsel
upon the state. 93 Constitutional rights, however, cannot be denied
87. Millemann, supra note 4, at 56 n.15, states:
[Griffin v. Illinois], 351 U.S. 12 (1956). Although there is no constitutional right
to appeal, if trial transcripts are provided to those inmates who can afford them for
purposes of preparing for appeal, they cannot be denied to indigents. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (the giving of an opportunity to have retained counsel at a hearing is likely to mean that it is necessary to
allow indigents to have appointed counsel at such hearings); Earnest v. Willingham, 406 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1969) (if a parole board allows the use of retained
counsel at a parole revocation hearing, it is required by the equal protection clause
to have counsel appointed for those less financially fortunate). See also Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
88. In Inmates v. McColley, Civil No. 72-764-M (D. Md. 1973) (a case now in litigation involving the right to counsel at prison disciplinary hearings), the plaintiffs' expert witness, in
describing the disciplinary system at the Kansas State Penitentiary, stated that telephoning attorneys for inmates imposed a minimal additional burden on the penitentiary
staff. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 80, at 22.
89. Bundy v. Cannon, 328 F. Supp. 165, 172 (D. Md. 1971).
90. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 80, at 42.
91. See MD. ANN CODE. art. 41, § 109 (1971) (parole system places responsibility for revocation decisions with the parole board, the members of which are not required to be attorneys); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 486 (1972) (independent decision maker at a
parole revocation hearing need not be a lawyer). See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970); Caulder v. Durham Housing Auth., 433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1970).
92. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 80, at 41, citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970);
Sands v. Wainwright, Civil No. 71-339-Civ-J-S (M.D. Fla., Jan. 5, 1973) (no right to appointment of counsel in hearings, but inmate may retain counsel if desired).
93. The Maryland Public Defender System and the Baltimore Legal Aid Bureau's Prisoner
Assistance Project are examples of potential sources. Also, third year law students would
be qualified to represent prisoners. Cf, MD. R. CIV. P. 18(c) (allowing 3d year students to
appear in court under supervision of counsel). Many law schools have prisoner's aid
programs which could be of assistance.
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because of a lack of funds. 9 4 The role of counsel in this setting is not
to challenge the role of correctional officers, but to develop facts which
aid in reaching a fair decision. 9 5
B. THE CLUTCHETTE AND MIRANDA DILEMMA

In the context of the prison disciplinary setting, many of the
offenses committed by inmates also constitute crimes, whereby the
inmate may be prosecuted by the state. Some of these offenses include
charges of assault against another inmate (or on a guard), possession of
weapons, rioting, possession or sale of drugs, and escape. At their
option, prison adjustment teams refer cases to the district attorney. In
these situations, the accused inmate is given the standard Miranda
warnings,96 including his right to remain silent, his right to counsel and
the fact that anything he says at the disciplinary hearing may be used
against him at his subsequent trial. "Should he [the inmate] then ask
for the assistance of counsel, either retained or appointed, he is told
that this right attaches only when he is questioned by the district
attorney.,,9 7 The dilemma faced by an inmate in this predicament is
that, should he choose to remain silent pursuant to his fifth amendment
rights; the disciplinary committee may still proceed to adjudicate his
case; thus the inmate is compelled to give up the right to present an
affirmative defense. "Should he desire to make a statement in his own
behalf, for example, a statement that he did do the act with which he is
charged but the circumstances were such as to mitigate his disciplinary
punishment, he does so at the peril of having his "confession" admitted
as evidence in a state prosecution.,,9 8
To solve this dilemma, the court in Clutchette v. Procunier 99
decided, among other available choices,l 00 that the prisoner must be
afforded counsel, not a counsel-substitute, when he is charged with a
prison rule violation which may be punishable by state authorities. In
94. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th
Cir. 1968); Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F.
Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), affd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
95. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 80, at 42 n.106 (plaintiffs expert witness testified that he,
as chairman of the disciplinary board, often discharged some of the responsibilities which
would normally be those of a "prosecutor").
96. See also Turner & Daniel, Miranda in Prison: The Dilemma of Prison Discipline and Intramural Crime, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 759, 761 n.ll (1972) [hereinafter cited as Turner].
97. Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767, 777 (N.D. Cal. 1971), appeal docketed, No.
71-2357, 9th Cir., Aug. 30, 1971.
98. Id.
99. 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
100. See Turner, supra note 96, at 764-65, which states:
[Instead of granting the inmates the right to counsel, other available alternatives
are]: ... (1) no disciplinary punishment at all would be imposed and the state
would rely on criminal prosecution as the only sanction; ... (3) a statutory or judicially implied immunity would be provided, permitting the inmate to defend himself in the disciplinary proceeding without the risk that his statements could be
used against him in the criminal prosecution; (4) the officials could decline, as a
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Miranda, "the Supreme Court recognized that custodial interrogation I 0 I of a person suspected of a crime 'contains inherently
compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to
resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so
freely.' ,,102 Therefore, the Court held that procedural safeguards must
be employed to protect the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination when a person suspected of criminal conduct is held
in custody for questioning. I 03 In the subsequent case of Mathis v.
United States, I 04 the Supreme Court stated that prisoners are entitled
to Miranda warnings when there is a chance that an incident will be
criminally prosecuted. I os The court in Clutchette reaffirmed this
principle, conduding that "[ t Jhe need for protection of the [fifth
amendment J privilege is even greater in the context of prison
disciplinary hearings because there is even greater pressure to abandon
the privilege caused by the necessity of conducting a defense to
administrative charges.,,1 0 6 In any proceeding in which an accused
party exercises his right to remain silent, he sacrifices one means of
defense. However, in the normal criminal prosecution, the defendant
still retains the means of defending himself by having his attorney call
and cross-examine witnesses. Furthermore, the defendant is entitled to
the presumption of innocence with the burden of proof (beyond a
reasonable doubt) on the state, a procedural safeguard unheard of
within the prison hearing room. Putting a choice to the prisoner to
abandon one right in favor of another is unquestionably unconstitutional.1 07
The logical argument against the application of Miranda rights to
prison disciplinary hearings is that the inmates are protected by the
"prophylactic" exclusionary rule. I 08 However, application of this rule
would not protect inmates against the risk of volunteering statements
matter of policy, to give the Miranda warnings, thus rendering inadmissible in
court whatever statements the prisoner might make in the disciplinary proceeding; and (5) the disciplinary proceeding would be postponed until after the crimi,
nal prosecution had concluded.
101. "By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any
significant way." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (emphasis added).
102. Carter v. McGinnis, 351 F. Supp. 787, 792 (1972), citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
467 (1966).
103. 384 U.S. at 478.
104. 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
105. [d. at 4.
106. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 80, at 51. Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767, 778
(N.D. Cal. 1971), which states: "The prisoner, warned that anything he says may be used
against him in a criminal prosecution, is put to the choice between remaining silent and
sacrificing his right to defend himself before the committee, or speaking to the committee
and risking incriminating himself in a future prosecution. The trap is unavoidable."
107. 328 F. Supp. at 779. See also Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967); Spevack v.
Klein, 388 U.S. 511, 515-19 (1967); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968);
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581-85 (1968).
108. All evidence obtained by an illegal search and seizure in violation of the fourth amendment
is inadmissible in federal and state court. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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which unintentionally incriminate them, 1 09 or against the use of
involuntary statements for impeachment purposes in subsequent
criminal prosecutions. 1 1 0
Recently, the court in Carter v. McGinnis, 1 1 1 was faced with the
same dilemma recognized in Clutchette. In reaching the conclusion that
the sentences imposed upon the plaintiff-inmates unconstitutionally
penalized their privilege against self-incrimination, the court refused to
follow the Clutchette rationale. Instead, it stated that either counselor
an inmate granted immunity would provide adequate procedural
safeguards, but since neither of these protections was made available,
the inmates' rights were violated. On the other hand, the Sands ' 1 2
court totally rejected the Clutchette solution, stating that "it is yet not
certain that even counsel can ... vitiate the constitutionally obnoxious
dilemma: it is then still as substantial as if the attorney were not
there.'" 1 3 The court, however, in recognizing the prisoner's predicament, granted accused inmates "use" immunity to the extent that his
statements would not be used affirmatively against him in future
criminal prosecutions. 1 1 4
If this immunity trend gains acceptance, inmate's right to counsel
based on the fifth and fourteenth amendments will be refuted.
Nonetheless, due process requires that prisoners have the right to retain
counsel at prison disciplinary hearings.
C. THE ROLE OF COUNSEL IN INSURING BUND¥ RIGHTS
Given the constitutional right of inmates to a full hearing before
imposition of major punishment, it is essential that counsel be allowed
to participate in order to insure a fair and impartial result. Such a due
process hearing is "adversarial," or "adjudicatory,'" 1 5 "insofar as it
applies pre-existing policies or rules to particular factual determinations.'" 1 6 This setting logically calls for the skills and talents which
only a lawyer can successfully exhibit.
Prison authorities, on the other hand, assert that counsel-substitute
adequately safeguard the interests of the accused inmate. 1 1 7 They
109. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966).
110. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); Inmates v. Rockefeller, 453 F.2d 12 (2d Cir.
1971).
111. 351 F. Supp. 787 (W.D.N.Y. 1972).
112. Civil No. 71-339-Civ-J-S (M.D. Fla., Jan. 5, 1973).
113. [d. at 36.
114. Sands v. Wainwright, Civil No. 71-339-Civ-J-S at 37 (M.D. Fla., Jan. 5, 1973).
115. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT, §§ 7.02-.04 (1972).
116. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 80, at 35. Contra, Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 196
(2d Cir. 1971).
117. As a former employee of the Maryland prison system who has witnessed disciplinary hearings at the Maryland Diagnostic-Reception Center, this writer believes that the use of
counsel-substitute is worthless. Prison staff members representing accused inmates often did not speak at all in the defense of their "clients" and were discouraged from calling witnesses or cross examination. Legal counsel could have been helpful to the accused and to the disciplinary board in articulating the facts.
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reason that inmate and prison staff representatives are more familiar
than legal counsel with the prison make-up and can therefore better
communicate with the prison adjustment team. This reasoning is faulty
in that many inmates lack the forensic, ability to communicate
adequately. Inmate-representatives invariably engage in irrelevant
argument and fail to focus upon issues central to the conditional
freedom of the accused. 1 1 8 Furthermore, correctional officers and
staff often resent being cross-examined by inmates, thus creating an
atmosphere of tension in the hearing room.
Frison staff representatives are similarly inadequate because of the
obvious conflict in roles: employed by the institution on one hand, and
representing the accused inmate on the other. For this reason inmates
do not often request representation by staff at disciplinary hearings. 1 1 9
In view of the inadequacy of either prison staff or inmate
representation, the only choice left to the accused inmate is to attempt
to defend himself at the hearing. This is obviously inadequate, due to
his lack of the training which would enable him to articulate possible
mitigating circumstances. He is often totally incapable of recognizing
and effectively rebutting factual statements made against him. His dual
role of advocate and subject of the inquiry leaves him in a position
from which he would not be able to make an objective analysis of the
impact and significance of the charges made by his accuser.l 2 0 Finally,
he cannot have the opportunity to investigate his case adequately
because he is locked in his prison cell.
Legal counsel would enjoy all the advantages which the prisoner
lacks as his own advocate: counsel would be able to take an objective
view of factual statements and allegations. The diligent attorney
certainly could put together a more accurate picture of the particular
incident by interviewing witnesses and accusers and obtaining relevant
documents from the inmate's file, thereby benefiting both the inmate
and the adjustment team. He would be able to determine whether the
testimony of a particular witness would be helpful to the accused
inmate, thus saving time. To help further shorten the procedure,
counsel could be responsible for insuring that accused inmates
understand the charges against them and thus avoid the necessity of
repetitiv'e notice.
Presently in Maryland, a prison employee (such as a social worker) is
responsible for the time-consuming task of informing the inmate that
he has been charged with a violation and that he has various (Bundy)
rights. If counsel were allowed and designated by the particular inmate,
the prison employee would simply inform the attorney that the inmate
has been placed in segregation for a prison violation and desires counsel.
118. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 80, at 54.
119. At ninety-five hearings of major violations at the Maryland House of Corrections between
June 1 and August 7, 1972, counsel-substitute was employed on only thirteen occasions.
[d. at 57.
120. See Comment, supra note 61, at 503. See also Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
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The burden would then be upon counsel to inform the inmate of the
charges and his rights and to conduct further investigations necessary to
present the inmate's case adequately. Therefore, "[i]n the context of a
prison disciplinary hearing, the role of counsel would be to utilize legal
skills to. ,adequately develop facts which may be the premise for
punishment.") 2 )
Another consideration in favor of the attorney's presence is the fact
that disciplinary hearings are not open to the public.) 2 2 One of the
most important protections against official arbitrariness is publicity. In
such a setting, where all of the participants in the hearing are employed
by the prison or the state, "it may well be that only the representation
of counsel can avoid a summary and coercive atmosphere."! 2 3 The
analogy to the parole revocation process is relevant in that "[t] he
presence of an attorney at a parole revocation hearing may be even
more necessary than that presence in a courtroom because of the
close-knit, almost family-like, atmosphere that prevails at parole
hearings. ,,! 2 4
Other ways in which counsel could be of assistance at the
disciplinary hearings include acting as a "buffer" between the inmates
and correctional officers who refuse or express hostility at being
questioned by the prisoners.) 2 5 This could serve to alleviate tensions in
the hearing room that inevitably result from inmates conducting
cross-examinations. Finally, it is important for rehabilitative purposes
that inmates perceive disciplinary proceedings as fair and just;! 2 6 with
an attorney present, there is a greater likelihood that this will be
accomplished.
IV. CONCLUSION
The plight of the prisoner has, in recent years, struck a responsive
chord in the judiciary. It is apparent that many courts have abandoned
the "hands-off" approach in dealing with prisoners' rights, examining
instead the reasonableness of the particular institutional rule in
question. To determine whether such a rule meets the requirements of
reasonableness, the courts have implemented a "balancing test,"
involving the relative interests of the state and the prisoner. The result
has been a virtual explosion of new standards and safeguards that have
121. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 80, at 23.
122. Even state legislators in New York have been banned from disciplinary hearings. The
matter is currently in litigation in the Supreme Court, Erie County, New York. Brief for
Appellant, Nieves v. Oswald, Dkt-No. 72-1974 (2d Cir. 1972), at 21.
123. C{. Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968); Blyden v. Hogan, 320 F. Supp. 513
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
124. Dyke, Parole Revocation Hearings in California: The Right to Counsel, 59 CAL. L. REV.
1215, 1227 n.49 (1971).
125. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 80, at 28.
126. Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
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given the prisoner a measure of dignity. This can only help the
much-maligned rehabilitative process that our prison systems are
reluctantly beginning to implement. In order to protect these newly
acquired rights, the prisoners' right to the assistance of counsel at
prison disciplinary hearings must become effective. The presence of
counsel in this setting can help guarantee the integrity of the system
and can force the adjustment team, through questioning of values and
assumptions, to make needed appraisals. 1 2 7 If this progressive trend
continues, there is an excellent prospect that the right to counsel will
truly become an effective one.
Mark A. Seff
127. Comment, The Parole System, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 282,364 (1971).

